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Mood and Comparative Judgment: Does Mood
Influence Everything and Finally Nothing?
CHENG QIU
CATHERINE W. M. YEUNG*
Research indicates that mood can influence evaluation of a product when consid-
ered in isolation. However, little is known about its influence on comparisons among
several alternatives. Four experiments assessed the nature of this influence. When
evaluating each option individually upon encountering it, happy participants re-
ported greater preferences for the first encountered option than unhappy partici-
pants. When withholding evaluations until having seen all options, however, happy
participants reported greater preferences for the last encountered option than un-
happy participants. Which comparison strategy was employed, and consequently
the impact of mood on preferences, depended on the similarity of choice alter-
natives in terms of appearance versus descriptive features.
T he affect that consumers happen to be experiencing atthe time they evaluate a stimulus can provide infor-
mation about their liking for the stimulus and, tberefore,
can influence their evaluation of it. Research in both social
psychology and consumer judgment has demonstrated this
influence and has circumscribed the conditions in which the
effect occurs (Pham 1998; Pbam and Avnet 2004; Pbam et
al. 2001; Scbwarz and Clore 1996; Yeung and Wyer 2004).
With few exceptions (e.g., Sbiv and Fedorikhin 1999,2002),
most previous research has focused on the influence of affect
when a stimulus is considered individually. Our understand-
ing of the role of affect in consumer judgment is therefore
restricted to situations wbere products are evaluated in iso-
lation. The challenge of extending this knowledge to the
choice context lies in tbe fact that choices are largely based
on differences between alternatives rather than tbe indepen-
*ChengOiu is assistanl professor ot" marketing at ihe Faculty of Business
and Economics, University of Hong Kong. Pokfulam Road, Hong Kotig
(cqiL@bu.siness.hku.hk). Catherine Yeung is assistant professor of mar-
keting at Ihe NUS Business School. National University of Singapore,
Singapore 117592, Republic of Singapore (cyeung@nus.edu.sg). Corre-
sponding author' Catherine Yeung. The two authors contributed equally to
ihis work, and Iheir names are arranged in alphabetical order. This re.search
was conducted during the tirst author's PhD study at the National University
ot" Singapore. The authors ihank Bob Wyer, Leong Siew Meng, Lee Yih
Hwai, and the JCR eililor, associate editor, and reviewers for their insightful
comments and suggestions, in addition, the authors thank Colin Soh, Mak
Ka Weng. and Sun Li for assi.stance in data collection. The suppon of
grant R-316-(HMK()52-I \2 from the Nalional University of Singapore and
the support of the NUS Markeling Department subject pool are gratefully
acknowledged.
.lohn Deighton served as editor and Mary Frances Luce served as associate
editor for this article.
Electronicatly published September 2t, 2007
dent evaluations of the alternatives. Thus, if an affect influ-
ences evaluations of all the alternatives in a similar way and
to a similar extenL it may not end up having any impact on
their choice probabilities (see Huber [2004] for a similar
comment).
In the present research, we show tbat the mood people
happen to be experiencing can have different effects on their
preferences for choice alternatives, depending on tbe order
in which the alternatives are considered. Specifically, we sug-
gest that consumers are likely to incorporate tbe mood they
are experiencing into the first evaluation they construct in tbe
course of making a comparison. Once this is done, however,
their mood is less likely to influence the evaluations tbat are
constructed subsequently. One implication of tbis proposition
is that the influence of mood on preferences depends on the
time at which the first evaluation is made. If consumers wbo
are exposed to multiple options evaluate eacb option spon-
taneously at the time tbey first encounter it. tbeir mcxjd may
influence tbeir evaluation of tbe first presented option. How-
ever, if consumers withhold tbeir evaluation until they have
seen all the options available, tbey may evaluate tbe last
presented (most recent) option first, and their mood may in-
fluence their evaluation of tbis option.
In tbe sections tbat follow, we first review the literature
on tbe influence of affect on independent judgment and
discuss its tbeoretical implications for comparative judg-
ment. We then report four experiments that examine these
implications.
AFFECT, INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT,
AND COMPARATIVE JUDGMENT
Individuals wbo are called upon to evaluate an object
often use tbe affect they are experiencing as information
657
2008 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH. Inc. • Vol. 34 • February 2008
All rights reservetl. 0O93-53Ol/2008/3'V05-0OO6$l0.0O
658 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
about how much they like it (Adaval 2001; Pham 1998;
Pham et al. 2001; Schwarz 1990; Schwarz and Clore 1983).
In some cases, the affect they experience may actually be
evoked by the stimulus being judged (Schwarz 2001; Shiv
and Fedorikhin 1999, 2002; Yeung and Wyer 2005, exper-
iment 1). However, individuals usually cannot distinguish
clearly between the different sources of affect that they ex-
perience at any given time. Consequently, if they happen to
be in a good mood or bad mood when they evaluate a target,
they may (mis)attribute this feeling to the target and use it
as a basis for the evaluation (Schwarz and Clore [1983,
1988]; see Pham [2004] for a discussion of the logic behitid
people's reliance on feelings in judgment).
For one's feelings to influence the evaluation of a target,
these feelings must be perceived as genuine responses to-
ward the target (Strack 1992). One's feelings may have little
impact on the evaluation of a target if the type of target
being evaluated does not normally elicit affective reactions
(Yeung and Wyer 2004), if one has concerns about the rel-
evance of feelings a.s a basis for the evaluation (Pham 1998),
or if one's attention is called to other factors that could
potentially account for the feelings (Schwarz and Clore
1983). In a classic study by Schwarz and Clore (1983), for
example, participants reported their life satisfaction to be
higher on sunny days than on rainy days, indicating that the
feelings elicited by the weather were misattributed to their
life as a whole. However, the effect of negative feelings was
eliminated when the experimenter happened to mention the
weather, thus directing participants* attention to this source
of their negative feelings. While the influence of positive
mood is less clear in this study, this finding implies that
when people attribute their negative feelings to one target,
the informational value of these feelings for evaluating an-
other target is often discounted, and hence the impact of
these feelings on the evaluation of the latter target is min-
imal. This attribution effect has been found applicable to
positive mood in a product evaluation context (Gorn. Gold-
berg, and Basu 1993) and has been conceptually replicated
in other research (Novemsky et al. 2007; Schwarz, Servay,
and Kumpf 1985; Siemer and Reisenzein 1998),
Affect Attribution and Comparative Judgment
The attributional effect discussed above has implications
for the conditions of concern in the present research. Sup-
pose consumers who are confronted with a choice among
multiple options evaluate each option separately and then
compare these evaluations to arrive at a preference. They
are likely to attribute their feelings to the first option they
evaluate, as if they are evaluating this option individually.
Thus, they will evaluate it more favorably when they are
in a good mood than when they are in a bad mood. Having
made this evaluation, however, they may discount the in-
formational value of their feelings to tbe options they con-
sider subsequently. Mood will therefore have a minimal
effect on the evaluations of these latter options. When they
later compare the evaluations to arrive at a preference, their
preference for the first evaluated option will increase with
the mood that they are experiencing.
To nail down the specific influence of mood on compar-
ative judgment, we have to specify which of the options in
a choice set is the first one to be evaluated. In some cases,
consumers may evaluate the options in the order in which
they are presented. As such, the first option they evaluate
is likely to be the first presented option. Mood will therefore
influence the evaluation of this particular option (rather than
the evaluations of the subsequently presented options) and
hence the preference for this option. In other cases, con-
sumers may forgo making an evaluation of any option until
they have seen all of the options available. Under this sit-
uation, the first option they evaluate is likely to be the last
one they have encountered, which is most salient to them
at the time of evaluation. Their mood .should therefore in-
fluence their evaluation of the last option rather than the
preceding ones. Consequently, they should prefer the last
presented option more if they are in a good mood than if
they are in a bad mood.
It is of course conceivable that mood exerts its influence
at the time consumers view each option rather than at the
time they evaluate a particular option. If this is so, mood
may influence evaluations of all the options regardless of
the considerations we discussed above. Although no re-
search bears directly on this possibility, a study by Srull
(1987) suggests that this is unlikely to be the case. In some
conditions of Srull's study, participants received product
information and evaluated the product right after their mood
had been induced. In otber conditions, they received the
information while they were in a good or bad mood but did
not evaluate the product until after their mood had dissi-
pated. Mood influenced their evaluations in the first con-
dition but not in the second. This suggests that mood influ-
ences an evaluation only if it coincides with the timing of
evaluation. Putting it another way, the finding Implies that
mood enters an evaluation at the precise time when the
evaluation is actually constructed. In the present context,
tbis suggests that although participants may be experiencing
a positive or negative mood at the time they view a set of
options, this mood may not influence the evaluations of the
options if these evaluations are not constructed at that point
of time.
The above considerations lead to the following hypoth-
esis:
HI: When consumers compare among multiple op-
tions, their mood will influence their preference
for the first option they evaluate. More specifi-
cally, consumers will evaluate this option more
positively, and will be more likely to choose it,
if they are in a positive mood than if they are
in a negative mood. In contrast, their mood will
have a minimal effect on evaluations of the op-
tions that are evaluated subsequently.
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FIGURE 1
STIMULI EMPLOYED IN EXPERIMENT 1
SouRCE.-Swee/ Seasons: Fabulous Restaurant Desserts Made Simple, by Richard Leach; photography by Boyd Hagen (New York: Wiley & Sons, 2001). 70,
72, and 210,
Situational Determinants of Comparison Strategy
The point at which consumers evaluate choice alternatives
ill the course of comparison may be determined by several
factors. Most obviously, participants might be explicitly told
either to evaluate each option individually at the time they
encounter it or to wait until they have seen all of the available
options before making an evaluation. However, character-
istics of the options themselves could also influence the
strategy that participants employ. For example, suppose the
options are similar in quality and function but differ only
in appearance. In this case, holistic, appearance-based eval-
uations will be perceived as a diagnostic basis for preference
formation. To this extent, a schematic assessment of the first
presented option would be triggered upon sight, which
would then lead to an affect-based evaluation of the option
(Pham et al. 2001; Yeung and Wyer 2004). However, sup-
pose consumers expect the options to differ in terms of
de.scriptive features that are central to their choice. Then,
[hey may be more inclined to defer their evaluation until
the information about the last option has been reviewed.
This prediction is generally consistent with the literature on
comparative judgment, which suggests tbat individuals who
expect to make preference judgments may not evaluate an
initial object in terms of its own descriptive features prior
to seeing a comparison object. Rather, they are likely to wait
until the features of the comparison object are also known
in order to evaluate the features in a relative sense. Moreover,
to the extent that they defer their judgment, they are likely
to begin by considering the most recently encountered op-
tion—the last option—as it is more salient and accessible
from memory than the preceding option(s) (see Houston,
Sherman, and Baker [1989| for a discussion of a similar
process; also see Wang and Wyer [2002]).
The above possibilities were examined in the research to
be reported. In experiment I. the options that we employed
had the same descriptive characteristic but different external
appearance. We assumed that participants would form an
evaluation of the first presented option at the time they
encountered it. Their mood would therefore influence this
evaluation but not the evaluations of options that were pre-
sented subsequently. Thus, we expected piulicipants to have
a stronger preference for the first option if they were in a
good mood than if they were in a bad mood. In the second
experiment, we asked participants to consider options that
differed not only in external appearance but also in a de-
scriptive characteristic. In this case, we expected participants
to defer evaluating the options until all the options had been
presented. Their mood would therefore influence their eval-
uations of the last presented option rather than those of the
preceding options. Hence, they would report a stronger pref-
erence for the last option when they were in a good mood
than when they were in a bad mood. After reporting the
results of these two experiments, we will present two other
experiments that confirmed our assumptions about the pro-
cesses that underlie the findings.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Stimulus Materials. We selected bakery products as
target stimuli. Evaluations of bakery products are typically
based on two criteria—flavor (a descriptive characteristic)
and presentation (e.x.ternal appearance). We chose three op-
tions with the same flavor (mango) but different presenta-
tions. The photographs of these options (see fig. I) were
printed on high-quality photo paper. All photographs had a
similar, yellowish tone to control for the possible influence
of color on the feelings they elicited.
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TABLE 1
CHOICES AND INDEPENDENT EVALUATIONS AS A
FUNCTION OF MOOD—EXPERIMENT 1
Positive mood (
Negative mood
n =
\n.
-• 65 )
- 66)
1st
option
49.2
25.8
Choice share {'•
2nd
option
26.2
39.4
Yo)
3rd
option
24.6
34.8
Independent evaluations
1st
option
4.32
3.55
2nd
option
3.90
4.27
3rd
option
3.89
4.30
To ensure that these options were comparable in favor-
ableness, 62 participants who did not participate in the main
study were each shown one of the options and indicated
both how much they liked it (0 = not at all; 10 = very
much) and how they felt about it ( -5 = very bad; -1-5 =
very good). All options were equally favorable (7.84, 7.56,
and 7.64 for the first, second, and third options shown in
fig. I. respectively; F < 1) and elicited similar feelings (3.46,
3.55, and 3.71, respectively; F < I).
Design and Procedure, Participants were 131 students
at the National University of Singapore who participated in
exchange for course credit. They were randomly assigned
to the two induced mood (positive vs. negative) conditions.
They performed two ostensibly unrelated tasks—one in-
duced their mood, and the other concerned product choice.
In the first task, participants were induced to experience
either a positive or a negative feeling with a procedure sim-
ilar to that employed by Schwarz and Clore (1983). Spe-
cifically, they were told that the study concerned the con-
struction of a database on the personal experiences of college
students. Participants in the positive (negative) mood con-
dition were asked to identify a recent event that was very
important to them and that made them feel happy (unhappy)
whenever they thought about it. They were asked to imagine
the experience in as much detail as possible, to try to reex-
perience the feelings they had at the time, and then to write
down a description of those feelings and the events that
elicited them. They spent approximately 20 minutes writing
their descriptions.
After completing the mood induction task, participants
were introduced to the second task with instructions that we
were conducting a .series of surveys that required partici-
pants to choo.se among different products of the sort they
might encounter in daily life and that the particular survey
they would complete was concerned with choices among
bakery products. On this pretext, we informed participants
that they would see photographs of three products that had
the same flavor. The photographs were presented in separate
folders denoted A. B, and C. In each folder, the description
"mango flavor" was printed below the photograph. Partic-
ipants were first instructed to open folder A, look at the
photograph for 5 seconds, close the folder, and then to repeat
the procedure for the B and C folders, respectively. The
sequence in which these folders were labeled and shown
was counterbalanced.
Tbe experimenter then passed out the choice questionnaire,
and participants indicated their choices. They then evaluated
each option individually on the next page. For each option,
they indicated how much they like it (0 = not at all; 10 =
very much) and how gotxl it is ( -5 = very bad; +5 =
very good).
To confirm the effectiveness of the mood induction pro-
cedure, participants were asked to report their feelings after
having de.scribed the personal experience. These feelings
were assessed by four scales pertaining to how happy, good,
unhappy, and bad they were feeling; all ranged from zero
(not at all) to 10 {very much). The average of each partic-
ipant's responses to the second two items was subtracted
from the average of his or her responses to the first two
items to provide an overall index of the positive feeling that
the participant was experiencing.
Results
Mood Manipulation Check. The mood induction pro-
cedure was successful. Participants reported feeling happier
after describing their experience in the positive mood con-
dition than in the negative mood condition {4.95 vs. -3.14;
F(\, 129) = 172.52, p < .001, vl = -57).
Choices and Independent Evaluations, Choice shares
of the three options as a function of the two mood conditions
are reported in the left half of table I. An overall 2 (mood)
X 3 (option) chi-square analysis of these proportions re-
vealed an association between participants' mood and their
choices (x"(2) = 7.13,p < .05). To understand whether this
association was specifically due to an impact of mood on
choice of the first option, two additional cbi-square tests
were conducted {Agresti 1996). First, a chi-square test based
on the last two columns of the 2 x 3 contingency table did
not indicate any association between mood and choices of
the last two options {x"{ D = -02, p > .50). Choices of the
last two options were therefore combined and compared with
choice of the first option. Tbe result showed that happy and
unhappy participants differed in their choice of the first option
relative to their choices of the other two options combined
(X'(l) — 7.71, /j<.01). As predicted, the choice share of
the first option was higher when participants were happy
(49.2%) than when they were unhappy (25.8%; z = 2,79,
p<.Q5),
In principle, the shift in choice shares across the two mood
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conditions may be driven by changes in the attractiveness
of the first option or by opposite changes in the attractiveness
of the other options. However, if participants had indeed
attributed their mood to the first option, as we predicted,
the shift in choice shares should be driven by changes in
the attractiveness of the first option in particular We next
evaluate this possibility. Recall that participants evaluated
each of the three options by indicating the extent to which
they liked the option and how good the option was. Their
responses to ihese items for each option were averaged to
form an index of how much they liked the option. These
evaluations are summarized in the right half of table 1. A
2 (mood) X 3 (evaluations of the three options) mixed
ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between mood
and the three evaluations (F{2,258) = 4.48, p = .01,
tj; = .03). Planned comparisons revealed that happy par-
ticipants evaluated the first option more favorably than un-
happy participants (4.32 vs. 3.55, respectively; t{\29) —
1.97. p = .05, T;;, = .03).' However, the two groups did not
differ appreciably in their evaluations of the second option
(3.90 vs. 4.27;/(129) - 1.18,/^ = .24) and the third option
(3.89 vs. 4.30; r(129) = 1.25, p = .21).
Discussion
In this experiment, we show that preferences for the first
presented option increased with the mood that participants
were in and that this was due largely to the effect of mood
im the evaluations of the first presented option, rather than
the evaluations of the subsequently pre.sented options.
To ensure that our results were not dependent on the
number of options that participants considered, we per-
formed a supplementary study that was identical to the main
experiment but involved only two options (specifically, the
first two options shown in fig. 1). Fifty-five participants were
randomly assigned to the two mood conditions. The con-
clusions drawn from this study are identical to those that
emerge from the main experimenl. That is, 69.0% of happy
participants chose the first option, whereas only 38.5% of
unhappy participants did so {x^(l) = 5.15, p < .05). More-
over, planned comparisons of the evaluations of each option
indicated that happy participants evaluated the first option
more favorably than unhappy participants did {4.93 vs. 3.77,
respectively; /(53) = 2.33, p < .05, rfj, = .09), whereas
their evaluations of the second option did not differ (4.34
vs. 4.23, respectively; t< I). Although a mixed ANOVA
showed that the interaction of mood and evaluations was not
significant (F( 1, 53) = 1.76, /) = .19), the planned compar-
isons were consistent with our predictions,
Both experiment I and the 2-option replication showed
an influence of mood on the preference for the first presented
option. According to hypothesis 1. however, this should not
be the case if the first presented option is not the first one
'Here and subsequeiiily. planned comparisons are r-iests conducied using
Ihe error term of ihc full ANOVA inoUel. See Keppel(199l, 122-23) for
lunher discussion.
that participants evaluate. Experiment 2 examined this possi-
bility,
EXPERIMENT 2
This experiment was similar to experiment I except that
the choice alternatives differed in flavor as well as appear-
ance. Participants were told at the outset that the alternatives
had different flavors and that they would learn each option's
flavor only when they saw its photograph. Therefore, they
would be in anticipation of additional, diagnostic informa-
tion until they had received information of the last option.
This was expected to increase the likelihood that participants
would withhold making any evaluations until they had seen
all of the options. We therefore predicted that participants'
mood would influence their evaluation of the last presented
option rather than the preceding ones. Consequently, they
would prefer the last option to a greater extent wben they
were in a good mood tban when they were in a bad mood.
Method
Stimulus Materials. Three pies (blueberry, almond,
and plum) were selected as stimulus materials. Photographs
of these options, shown in figure 2, were evaluated by 63
participants who did not take part in the main experiment.
The three options were rated similarly both in favorableness
{7.51, 7.39, and 7.59 for the first, second, and third options
shown in the figure, respectively; F < 1) and in the feelings
they elicited (4.01, 3.94, and 3.89, re.spectively; F< 1).
Design and Procedure. One hundred students at the
National University of Singapore participated in the exper-
iment in exchange for course credit. They were assigned
randomly to the two induced mood conditions (positive vs.
negative). As in the first experiment, participants first en-
gaged in a mood induction task, followed by a choice task.
When they were introduced to the latter task, they were told
that the bakery products they would be considering had
different flavors and that they would know each option's
flavor only when they saw its photograph from a folder.
Each folder showed a photograph of a bakery product with
a label below the photograph describing its flavor. After
exposure to the three products, participants indicated choices
and made ratings as they did in experiment 1.
Results
Mood Manipulation Check. The mood induction pro-
cedure was successful. Participants reported being happier
after describing tbeir experience in the positive mood con-
dition than in the negative mood condition (5.52 vs. —3.11;
F(l,98) = \92.16,p<,00\,vl = .66).
Choices and Independent Evaluations, In contrast to
experiment I, the effects of mood on choice were expected
to localize in the last presented option. The findings were
shown in the left half of table 2. Although the overall chi-
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FIGURE 2
STIMULI EMPLOYED IN EXPERIMENT 2
SOURCE.-Mffl/on Menus (London: Octopus Publishing Group, 2004), 242, 244, and 248.
square test based on the 2 x 3 contingency table was only
marginally significant (x"{2) = 5.35, p = .07), two other
tests support our prediction that mood would influence the
preference for the last option. First, the effect of mood on
choices of the first two options did not differ across the two
mood conditions (x^d) = .l7,/j > .50). Therefore, choices
of the flrst two options were combined and compared with
the choice of the last option. The result showed that happy
and unhappy participants differed in their choice of the last
option relative to their choices of the preceding options
(X'(l) = 5.19,/;< .05). More specifically, participants were
more likely to choose the last option when they were happy
(48%) than when they were unhappy {26%; z = 2.27, p <
.05).
Independent evaluations of the alternatives, shown in the
right half of table 2. revealed an analogous pattern. A mixed
ANOVA of the three evaluations as a function of mood
yielded a marginally significant interaction of mood and the
three evaluations (F(2, 196) = 2.53, p = .08, T;; = .03),
Planned comparisons indicated that participants liked the last
option more when they were in a positive mood {M = 4.39)
than when they were in a negative mood (M = 3.34;
/{98) = 2.31, p < .05,7)1 = .05). However, mood influenced
the evaluation of neither the tirst option (3.82 vs. 4.12; r < 1)
nor the second (3,56 vs. 3.71; / < 1).
Discussion
In this experiment, we showed that preferences for the
last presented option increased with the mood that partici-
pants were in and that this was due largely to the effect of
mood on the evaluation of the last presented option rather
than tbe evaluation of the first presented option. These re-
sults clearly differ from those obtained in the first experi-
ment. We have attributed this difference to the different time
at which evaluations were made in the two experiments.
That is, participants who knew that the options differed only
in appearance might have evaluated each option at the time
it was presented, as in experiment 1. However, when they
expected the options to differ with respect to attributes that
are more central to their evaluation, they might have deferred
their evaluation until all of the options had been presented.
However, a question concerning the validity of this inter-
pretation may arise from the fact that the time at which
participants made their evaluations was neither directly as-
sessed nor manipulated. Experiment 3 addressed this ambi-
guity.
EXPERIMENT 3
The purpo,se of this experiment was to validate the as-
sumptions that we made in the previous experiments con-
cerning the time at which the first evaluation was constructed
and hence to provide evidence of the underlying process
that we proposed. To do so, we included process baseline
conditions in which participants were either instructed to
evaluate each option as it was presented or not to make any
evaluations until they had seen all the options (see Pham
[1998J, experiment 2, for a similar design). Results in these
TABLE 2
CHOICES AND INDEPENDENT EVALUATIONS AS A
FUNCTION OF MOOD—EXPERIMENT 2
Positive mood (n =
Negative mood (n =
50)
50)
option
24
38
Choice share (^
2nd
option
28
36
%>)
3rd
option
48
26
Independent evaluations
1st
option
3.82
4.12
2nd
option
3.56
3.71
3rd
option
4.39
3.34
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TABLE 3
TIMING OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FIRST
EVALUATION—EXPERIMENT 3
No instruction
Immediate
judgment
Deferred
judgment
Same flavor
Different flavor
5.16 (n = 41)
4 43 (n = 40)
4.63 (n = 34)
4.91 (n = 32)
4.19 (n= 32)
4.41 (n = 32)
NOTE.—Larger numbers reflect greater dispositions to evaluate the tirst option imme-
diately after seeing it.
conditions were then compared with those obtained under
conditions similar to those examined in previous experi-
ments, where participants did not receive any instructions
about how to process the information. If participants from
a baseline condition reach similar decisions as the corre-
sponding uninstructed participants, the process imposed on
the baseline participants provides at least a paramorphic,
and possibly isomorphic, representation of the process fol-
lowed by the uninstructed participants. However, if the two
groups of participants reach different decisions, it is unlikely
that the process followed by the uninstructed participants
resembles the one specified in the baseline condition.
Method
Design and Stimulus Materials, Participants ware 211
students at the National University of Singapore who par-
ticipated in exchange for course credit. They were randomly
assigned to the 12 conditions of a 2 (induced mood: positive
vs. negative) x 2 (flavor: same flavor vs. different flavor)
X 3 (process type: no instruction vs. immediate judgment
vs. deferred judgment) factorial design. Participants were
asked to consider two options, which were described as
having either the same flavor or different flavors. In both
cases, we used the flrst two photographs in figure 1 to rep-
resent the options, The two options were described as having
a mango flavor in same-flavor conditions and were described
as having a peach flavor and a mango flavor (pretested to
be equally favorable), respectively, in different-flavor condi-
tions.
Procedure. All participants went through a mood in-
duction procedure similar to that employed in the previous
experiments and then moved on to a comparison task that
was ostensibly unrelated to the mood induction task. In im-
mediate-judgment conditions, participants evaluated each
option immediately after seeing it. Therefore, the first option
being evaluated, by the procedure administered, was the first
option participants encountered. Evaluations were reported
along scales pertaining to how much they liked it and also
how good it was; each ranged from zero (not at all) to 10
(very). Then, after both options were presented and eval-
uated, they reported their preferences for the two options
on a relative preference scale ranging from one (definitely
the first option) to 12 (definitely the second option),
Participants in deferred-judgment conditions were told
"because there are two different options, try not to make
any judgments until you have seen both. That is, . . . try
not to make any judgments until after you have seen the
second one." We expected that the first option participants
would evaluate would be the second option they encoun-
tered. After seeing both options, participants first reported
their preferences and then evaluated the individual options.
Participants in no-instruction conditions, like those in the
first two experiments, were not given any instruction on
when they should evaluate the options. These participants
first saw the two options, reported their preferences, and
followed with their evaluations of the options separately.
Finally, to confirm our assumptions about the time at
which participants made their evaluations, participants re-
ported their agreement with each of the following state-
ments: {a) I had formed an evaluation of the first dessert
before I saw information on the second dessert, and {h) I
did not start to form any evaluation of either dessert until
after I had seen information on both of them. Both ratings
were made along a scale from one (strongly disagree) to
seven (strongly agree). Each participant's response to the
second item was reverse coded and averaged with his/her
response to the first item to form a single index of the
disposition to evaluate the first option immediately after
seeing it.
Results
Mood Manipulation Check, The mood induction pro-
cedure was successful. Participants reported feeling happier
after describing their experience in the positive mood con-
dition than in the negative mood condition (6.10 vs, —3,78;
F{\, 199) = 803.32./?<.001, TJ; = .80).
Timing of the First Evaluation. Data pertaining to the
timing of constructing the first evaluation are summarized
in table 3. {Numbers are overall index, with larger numbers
indicating a greater disposition to evaluate the first option
immediately after seeing it.) An ANOVA of the data as a
function of process type, flavor type, and mood yielded an
interaction of process type and flavor type (F(2. 199) =
3.69, p < .05, rj-p = .04) that was independent of mood (the
three-way interaction was not significant: F{2. 199) =
1.47, p = .23). As expected, participants in no-instruction
conditions were more inclined to evaluate the first option
immediately when the alternatives had the same flavor
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TABLE 4
RELATIVE PREFERENCE AS A FUNCTION OF MOOD, PROCESS TYPE
AND FLAVOR CONDITIONS—EXPERIMENT 3
Same flavor:
Positive mood
Negative mood
Difference
Different flavor:
Positive mood
Negative mood
Difference
No instruction
4.43 (n = 21)
6.40 (n = 20)
-1.97
6,62 (n = 21)
4.42 (n= 19)
2.20
Immediate
judgment
5,06 (n= 18)
6.69 (n=16)
-1.63
4.94 (n -16)
7.13 (n= 16)
-2,19
Deferred
judgment
6.50 (n -16 )
5.06 (n= 16)
1.44
5.56 (n= 16)
4,56 (n=16)
1.00
NOTE.—Relative preference was measured on a 12-point scale (1 - strongly prefer the first
option; 12 = strongly prefer the second option).
(M = 5.16) than when they had different flavors (M =
4.43; /(I99) = 2,63. p<.Ol, ri; = .03). However, when
participants received instruction of when they should eval-
uate the options, the timing of the first evaluation did not
differ across the two flavor-type conditions (/ < 1 in both
cases). Participants reported a stronger tendency to evaluate
the flrst option immediately in immediate-judgment condi-
tions {M = 4.78) than in deferred-judgment conditions
(iW = 4.30; ^199) = 2.08, p < .05, vl = -02).
Relative Preference. Data on relative preference are
summarized in table 4. An ANOVA showed a significant
three-way interaction of mood, flavor type, and process type
(F{2. 199) = 5.i9,p<.0\,7); = .05). Our predictions were
evaluated in a series of planned comparisons and interaction
contrasts using the error term from the full ANOVA model
{Keppel 1991).
First, to confirm the conclusions drawn from our earlier
studies, we considered the no-instruction conditions alone
and compared the effect of mood across the two flavor-type
conditions. The interaction of flavor type and mood was
significant {F{l, 199) = 13.43, p<.00\, ij; = .06). In
same-flavor conditions, happy participants reported stronger
preference for the first option than unhappy participants did
(A^ K.ppv = 4.43 vs. A/,,,,pp, = 6.40: r{199) = 2.47, p<
,05, i7p = .03; recall that smaller numbers indicate a pref-
erence toward the first option). A reverse pattern was ob-
served under different-flavor conditions. Happy participants
reported stronger preferences for the second option than
unhappy participants did (6.62 vs. 4.42; t(\99) = 2.71,
p < .01, j ; ; ; = .04). These results are consistent with those
from experiments I and 2.
Second, to evaluate our assumption that the effects of
mood on preference depended on the time at which the
options were evaluated, we considered immediate-judgment
and deferred-judgment conditions alone and analyzed pref-
erences as a function of instructional condition (immediate
vs. deferred), flavor type (same vs. different), and mood
{positive vs. negative). It was expected that the instruction
on the timing of evaluation would override the effect of
flavor type in determining which option would be evaluated
first and hence which option would be more subject to mood
effect. This ANOVA yielded an interaction of mood and in-
structional conditions (F(l, 199) = 12.14, /J < .001, rj^ =
.06) independent of flavor (as indicated by the nonsignificant
three-way interaction, F<]). Planned comparisons further re-
vealed that participants in immediate-judgment conditions pre-
ferred the first option more when they were happy (M =
5.00, averaged across the two flavor types) than when they
were unhappy (M = 6.91, averaged across the two flavor
types;/(199) = 3.03,/? < .01, T;; = .04), whereas participants
in deferred-judgment conditions preferred the second option
more when they were happy (A/ = 6.03) than when they were
unhappy (Af = 4.81; K199) = 1.91,/? = .06, rj;, = .02),
Next, if the effect of mood under no-instruction, same-
flavor conditions reflects a tendency to evaluate options at
the time they are encountered, this effect may not differ
from its effect in immediate-judgment conditions, but it
should differ from its effect in deferred-judgment conditions.
The no-instruction, .same-flavor conditions were thus compared
with immediate-judgment conditions and deferred-judgment
conditions, respectively, through two interaction contrasts. The
results revealed that the effect of mood in no-instruction, same-
flavor conditions (4.43 vs. 6.40; Mj,ff = -1.97) did not differ
appreciably from that observed in immediate-judgment con-
ditions (5,00 vs. 6.91; A/^ r^f = -1 .91 ;F< I) but was opposite
in direction to its effect in deferred-judgment conditions (6.03
vs. 4.81: yW,,,,, = 1.22; F(l, 199) = 9.12,p < .O],-^; = .05).
Correspondingly, if the effect of mood under no-instruc-
tion, different-flavor conditions is attributable to a tendency
to defer judgments until after all options have been pre-
sented, its effect should not differ appreciably from that
observed in deferred-judgment conditions, but it should dif-
fer from its effect in immediate-judgment conditions. In-
teraction contrasts showed that the effect of mood in the
no-instruction, different-flavor conditions {6.62 vs, 4.42;
A/ji,f = 2.20) did not differ from its effect in deferred-judg-
ment conditions (6.03 vs. 4.81; M,,,,, = 1.22; F < 1) but was
opposite in direction to its effect in immediate-judgment condi-
tions {5.00 vs. 6.91; M^,r>- = -1.91; F(l, 199) = 16,00,
P<.i)Uv; = .07).
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TABLE 5
INDEPENDENT EVALUATIONS AS A FUNCTION OF MOOD. PROCESS TYPE, AND
FLAVOR TYPE CONDITIONS—EXPERIMENT 3
Same flavor:
Positive mood
Negative mood
Difference
Different flavor:
Positive mood
Negative mood
Difference
No instruction
1st
option
7.76
6.72
1.04
6.38
6.67
-.29
2nd
option
6.57
6.72
-.15
6.89
5.56
1.33
Immediate judgment
1st
option
7.48
6.58
.90
7.90
7.29
.61
2nd
option
6.93
6.90
.03
6.75
7.52
-.77
Deferred judgment
1st
option
6.63
7.46
-.83
7.46
7.65
-.19
2nd
option
6,69
6.60
,09
6.52
6.54
-.02
Independent Evaluations. Participants' evaluations of
each option separately are shown in table 5. A mixed
ANOVA using the two options' evaluations as a within-
subject factor (referred to as "option" hereafter) yielded a
signification interaction of mood, flavor, process type, and
option (F(2, 199) = 4.54. p < .05. ri; = .04). Planned com-
parisons and interaction contrasts analogous to those per-
formed on relative preference data provided support for our
assumptions.
First, a mixed ANOVA based on evaluations under no-
instruction conditions alone yielded an interaction of mood,
flavor, and option(F{l. 199) = 9.81,/J < .01, i?;, = .05). the
nature of which confirms the results of the first two exper-
iments. That is. in same-flavor conditions, mood had a
greater effecl on evaiuations of the first option (7.76 vs.
6.72, under positive vs. negative mood conditions, respec-
tively; t{\99) = 2.04, p<.05, 1)1 = .02) than on evalua-
tions of the second (6.57 vs. 6.72; / < 1), whereas in dif-
ferent-flavor conditions, mood had a stronger influence on
evaluations of the second option (6.89 vs. 5.56; r(199) =
2.46, p < .05. ril = .03) than the first (6.38 vs. 6.67; / < 1).
Next, we ran a mixed ANOVA that focused on the two
instnictional conditions. It yielded an interaction of mood
(po.sitive vs. negative), instructions (immediate vs. deferred),
and option (F(l, 199) = 5.54, p < .05. % = .03) that was
Independent of flavor type (F< 1). Under immediate-judg-
ment conditions, mood had an influence on evaluations of
the first option (M = 7.69 vs. M = 6.94, averaged across
the two flavor types; r( 199) = 1.86./J = .06. jj; = .02) but
not on evaluations of the second option (6.84 vs. 7.21;
r < 1). Contrary to our expectation, under deferred-judgment
conditions, mood influenced neither the evaluation of the
tirst option (7.05 vs. 7.55;/(199) = 1.24. p = .21)northe
second option (6.61 vs. 6.57; r< 1). We will discuss this
further in the discussion.
Finally, we compared the findings from the no-instruction
conditions to those from the instructional conditions. The effect
of mood on evaluations of the two options under no-instruction,
same-flavor conditions {Mans = 1-04 and —.15 for the first
and second options, respectively) did not differ from the effect
under immediate-judgment conditions (A/jiff = .76 and —.37,
respectively; averaged over the two flavor types), as evi-
denced by an interaction of mood and option
(F(l. 199) = 5.5O./X.O5. Tj; = .03) that was independent
of instructional conditions {F < I). Corresponding contrasts
under conditions where participants were expected to defer
judgments are somewhat more equivocal. Mood had little
effect on judgments of the first option in either the no-
instruction, different-flavor or the deferred-judgment con-
ditions, as expected (M .^^ f = - .29 and - . 5 1 . respectively).
However, its effect on judgments of the second option was
smaller in deferred-judgment conditions (M^^f, = .04) than
in no-instruction, different-flavor conditions (Mjiff = 1.33).
This discrepancy from prediction is perplexing and is ex-
amined in more detail in tbe next experiment.
Discussion
Findings of this experiment were generally consistent
with our expectations, However, the failure of mood to in-
fiuence individual evaluations of the second option in de-
ferred-judgment conditions is somewhat disconcerting. In
fact, mood not only failed to infiuence evaluations of the
second option but its effect on relative preference was only
marginally significant (M|,„pp^  = 6.03 vs. A/.nhappy = ^.81;
/(199) = 1.91, p = .06), despite the relatively large cell
size after combining the two flavor types in these conditions.
We suspected that this was due to an ineffective manipu-
lation of judgment deferral. Specifically, suppose the in-
struction of "not to make any judgments until you have seen
both options" was well received. The instruction might have
prompted participants to think about avoiding making any
immediate judgments when seeing the first option. This
thought itself, however, might make tbe immediate-judg-
ment goal even more accessible and. consequently, difficult
to avoid (Higgins 1996; see also Wegner et al. [1987] for
a similar finding). If this was tbe case, our participants migbt
not have always, or uniformly, deferred their evaluations
despite being instructed to do so. Although the measure on
evaluation time showed that participants in deferred-judg-
ment conditions bad a relatively stronger disposition to defer
their evaluations than those in immediate-judgment condi-
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TABLE 6
RELATIVE PREFERENCE AND INDEPENDENT EVALUATIONS AS A FUNCTION OF MOOD
AND PROCESS INSTRUCTION—EXPERIMENT 4
No instruction, different flavor:
Positive mood (n = 18)
Negative mood (n - 18)
Deferred judgment, same flavor:
Positive mood (n - 17)
Negative mood {n = 16)
Deferred judgment, different flavor:
Positive mood (n = 17)
Negative mood {n = 17)
Relative preference
5.94
4.50
6.24
4.75
6,00
4,71
Evaluation of
the 1st option
6.06
6.28
5.88
6.89
6.06
6.24
Evaluation of
the 2nd option
6.33
4.83
6.29
4.75
6.47
5,12
NOTE.—Relative preferance was measured on a 12-point scale (1 = strongly prefer the first option; 12
strongly prefer the second option).
tions, this might reflect a demand effect in the deferred-
judgment conditions because an explicit instruction of judg-
ment deferTai was given to participants in these conditions.
To tbis extent, the deferred-judgment conditions may not be
an unambiguous standard for evaluating the results in the
no-instruction, different-flavor conditions. The next exper-
iment attempted to eliminate this problem.
EXPERIMENT 4
Method
This experiment was restricted to the three conditions in
which participants were expected to judge the final option
first (i.e.. the "no-instruction, different-flavor." "deferred-
judgment, same-flavor." and "deferred-judgment, different-
flavor" conditions). However, the procedure used in the two
deferred-judgment conditions was modified. Instead of pre-
senting the materials as part of a comparison task, the ex-
perimenter told participants that we were concerned with
how individuals remember pictorial information and asked
them to try to remember the pictures conveyed in tbe ma-
terials as well as they could. After presenting the two options
sequentially, as in experiment 3, participants were unex-
pectedly asked to evaluate the second option, followed by
the first option, and then to indicate their relative preference.
This procedure provided a more unambiguous baseline for
comparing with no-instruction, different-flavor conditions.
Moreover, as judgment deferral was not enforced by using
any explicit instructions, we could avoid the potential prob-
lems associated with the use of such an instruction as in
experiment 3.
One hundred and three participants were randomly as-
signed to each of the six conditions of a 3 (process type:
no instruction, different fiavor vs. deferred judgment, same
flavor vs. deferred judgment, different flavor) x 2 (induced
mood: positive vs. negative) factorial design.
Results
Mood Manipulation Check. The mood induction pro-
cedure was successful. Participants reported feeling happier
after describing their experience in the positive mood con-
dition than in the negative mood condition (4.44 vs. -2 .31;
F(1.97) = 86.91. p<.001,1?; = .47).
Timing of the First Evaluation. The time at which
participants reported making their first evaluation was com-
puted as in experiment 3. Participants in instructional (de-
ferred-judgment) conditions showed a similar tendency to
do so regardless of whether the options had the same fiavor
(M = 3.29) or different flavors (M = 3.31; / < 1). More-
over, this tendency did not differ from that observed under
no-instruction conditions (M = 3.56; r< 1). Neither the
main effect of process type nor the interaction between mood
and process type was significant (F< 1 in both cases).
Relative Preference and Independent Evaluations.
Tbe relative preference data, as shown in table 6, replicated
the findings of experiment 3. A 3 (process type) x 2 (mood)
ANOVA yielded a main effect of mood (F( 1,97) = 11.31.
p<.0\, 7)1 = .10) independent of pnKess type (F< I). A
planned comparison suggested that participants under the no-
instruction conditions had a stronger preference for the second
option when they were in a positive mood {M = 5.94) than
when they were in a negative mood {M = 4.50; r(97) =
2.04, p < .05, 7)1 = .04). Similarly, participants under the two
instructional conditions had a stronger preference for the second
option when they were in a positive mood (M = 6.12. aver-
aged across the two fiavor types) than when they were in a
negative mood {M = 4.73. averaged across the two flavor
types; f(97) = 2.68. p<.Ol, 7)1 = .07), and the difference
did not differ across the two flavor type conditions (F< 1).
An additional interaction contrast showed that effects of
mood under the instructional conditions did not differ from
those observed under tbe no-instruction conditions {F< I).
The evaluation data were also consistent with expecta-
tions. A 2 (tbe two options' evaluations) x 2 (mood) x 3
(process type) mixed ANOVA yielded a significant inter-
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action between mood and option (F(l.97) = 11.36. p<
.01. 7)1 = .II) that did not depend on process type (F< 1).
As expected, happy and unhappy participants in the no-
instruction conditions did not differ in terms of tbeir eval-
uations of the first option (6.06 vs. 6.28; r< 1). This was
also the case for the two instructional conditions (5.97 vs.
6.46; r(97) = 1.21, p = .25; means were average of the
two flavor types, as the evaluations did not differ appreciably
as a function of fiavor type, F < I). Of central interest is
ihe evaluation of the second option. Participants in no-
instruction conditions evaluated the second option more
favorably when they were happy than when they were
Luihappy (6.33 vs. 4.83; r(97) = 2.19, p < .05, TJ; = .05).
A similar pattern was observed under instructional condi-
tions (6.38 vs. 4.93. averaged across the two fiavor types;
H91) = 2.88./X .Ol.Tj;, = .08). which did not differacross
the two instructional conditions {F< I). Additional inter-
action contrast suggested that effects of mood under no-
instruction conditions did not differ from those observed
under the instructional conditions (F< I).
Discussion
Findings of this experiment indicated that participants in
defened-judgment conditions had held off their judgments
until they had seen the second option and attributed their
feelings to the second option rather than the first presented
option. This also appeared to be the way that participants
in no-instruction conditions made their compiu i^son. Thus,
in combination with the evidence obtained in experiment 3.
these results provide good evidence that the influence of
mood on comparison depends on which alternative is the
one being evaluated first. That is. when panicipants eval-
uated the options starting with the first, tbey preferred the
lirst option more when tbey were in a positive mood than
when they were in a negative mood, whereas when partic-
ipants evaluated the options starting witb the last, they pre-
ferred the last option more when tbey were in a positive
mood than when they were in a negative mood.
It would nevertheless be inappropriate to conclude tbat
consumers always defer their evaluations whenever the
choice scenario resembles the one in the different-flavor
condition. Findings of experiment 3 indicate that people may
not uniformly hold off evaluation even when they are ex-
plicitly instructed to do so. Having said that, however, we
have to emphasize that the relationship between evaluation
time and choice set characteristics is not the point of the-
oretical interest in itself in tbe present research. Therefore,
the findings based on the no-instruction, different-flavor and
the deferred-judgment conditions alone are not definitive.
Rather, the findings in combination, coupled with findings
from the no-instruction, same-flavor and the immediate-
judgment conditions provide evidence for the proposition
that the influence of mood on comparison depends on which
alternative is the one being evaluated first.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
A substantial amount of research has been devoted to
understanding the infiuence of affect on consumer judgment
(see Pham [2004] for a review). However, it is surprising
that little research has been done to examine how affect
influences comparisons and choices. Our research fllls tbis
gap by demonstrating a systematic infiuence of mood on
choice, which contrasts with the general assumption that
mood is unlikely to influence choice. In the first experiment.
we showed that when participants were disposed to evaluate
each product at the time it was presented, mood influenced
the evaluation of the first presented option rather than tho.se
of the subsequently presented options. Consequently, mood
influenced choice of the flrst presented option. However, in
the second experiment, when participants were disposed to
withhold their evaluations until all of the options had been
presented, mood appeared to influence the evaluation and
the choice of the last presented option. Then, we provided
evidence that the different effect of mood across these ex-
periments was due to the different timing at which tbe first
evaluation was constructed in the course of comparison.
Altogether, these findings suggest that the influence of mood
on comparison depends on which alternative in a choice set
is the one being evaluated first.
Several aspects of our research are worthy of further dis-
cussion. First, in the present research, we consider com-
parisons that are made based on global evaluations of choice
alternatives. This is obviously not the only way to make
comparisons. In the consumer choice literature, researchers
distinguish between comparisons that are conducted in an
attribute-by-attribute manner and those that are based on
global evaluations of cboice alternatives (see Bettman, John-
son, and Payne [1991] for a review). Tbe strategy we con-
sider in the present research is more consistent with the latter
type of comparison. We, of course, expect the infiuence of
mood on comparison to be different depending on how it
is actually conducted. For this reason, we define a domain
for the present research and control for the comparison strat-
egy that participants employed in our experiments. The stim-
uli we employed were therefore designed to facilitate the
formation of global evaluations and the use of these eval-
uations as a basis of comparison. For example, we presented
pictures showing alternatives" appearance, wbicb is likely
to stimulate the formation of global evaluations. Also, we
provided very limited descriptive information so that par-
ticipants were unlikely to engage in attribute-based com-
parison. A worthwhile avenue for further research would be
to extend the domain for investigation and examine tbe in-
fluence of mood in attribute-based comparison. For example,
because attribute-based comparison requires the comparison
of specific attributes associated with each alternative, it has
a certain level of cognitive requirement (Mantel and Kardes
1999). Thus, if affect infiuences a decision-maker's moti-
vation to engage in cognitive activities (Schwarz and Clore
1996), or if it influences the ability to process information
(Eysenck 1982). it may potentially influence the tendency
to conduct an attribute-by-attribute comparison. Moreover,
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if the alternatives' attributes differ in valence, feelings may
influence bow tbe attributes are attended to, encoded, and
weighted (Adaval 2001; Forgas and Bower 1987) in the
course of comparison. In any ca.se, while we expect the
existing affect theories in the independent judgment domain
to be generalizable to the comparative judgment domain,
we also expect to see some distinct influences of affect on
comparative judgment that could not be directly extended
from the previous research. Therefore, this would be an
interesting avenue for future research.
Second, the present research is restricted to conditions in
which people interpret their feelings as an indication of bow
much tbey like a target and use tbese feelings as a basis for
evaluating the target (i.e.. tbe "affect-as-information" con-
ceptualization; Schwarz 1990). Our assumption that mood
influences the evaluation of an altemative at the precise time
the evaluation is constructed (Srull 1987) follows directly
from the affect-as-information conceptualization. This as-
sumption, however, is not entirely consistent with other the-
ories that suggest that mood can activate mood-consistent
thoughts and. therefore, infiuence the manner in which peo-
ple process information and make judgments (e.g.. Bower
1981; for a review, see Forgas [1995]). Although this latter
theory did not seem to explain the findings in the present
research, it would be inappropriate to conclude tbat mood
would not infiuence comparison through the activation of
feeling-consistent thoughts. As discussed earlier, it is intui-
tively likely thai the infiuence of mood on comparison through
the activation of feeling-consistent cognitions will be more
prominent in attribute-based comparisons. This would be an-
other worthwhile avenue for further investigation.
Third, our finding shows that when alternatives under
consideration are characterized by a descriptive feature, con-
sumers are likely to defer their evaluations until after they
have seen the last altemative. Nevertheless, this finding
should not be overgeneralized, as it may only be tme when
consumers consider a limited number of options. Presum-
ably, if consumers want to wait until tbey have seen the last
option to make a judgment, they bave to remember the
descriptive features of each encountered option. Tt is, how-
ever, impossible to memorize all the alternatives* descriptive
features if they have a large choice set to consider. Future
empirical research is needed to extend the existing findings
to this type of choice situation.
In a related vein, our finding shows that choice set con-
figuration may be an important determinant of comparison
strategy. We find that when a choice set is configured in
such a way that the alternatives differ in only external ap-
pearance, consumers tend to evaluate the first presented op-
tion immediately. However, when alternatives differ in de-
scriptive features that are more central to judgment,
consumers tend to defer their evaluations to a later time.
We attributed this difference to the higher perceived diag-
nosticity of global, appearance-based evaluations as a basis
for choice in the former case than in the latter case. However,
we bave not provided an empirical test of this underlying
assumption. Future research is needed to provide a more
systematic examination of the underlying mechanism, as
well as the effect of other situational influences on com-
parison strategy.
Aside from the above issues, we would like to point out
that although we have obtained support across experiments
for our theoretical framework, the effect sizes are quite mod-
est. The importance of this research, however, should not
be judged by the magnitude of effect sizes. Like most con-
sumer behavior research, our research selected the levels of
tbe factors systematically based on theoretical consider-
ations, which in the first place makes tbe effect-size esti-
mates less informative for judging theoretical importance
(see Fern and Monroe [19961 for a discussion of the dif-
ference between these models and the implications to effect
sizes). Moreover, our findings provide evidence contrasting
the viewpoint that existing theoretical frameworks on sub-
jective experience effects (e.g.. mood, metacognitive ex-
perience) have limited applicability in tbe choice domain.
Thus, the presence of an effect on choice, regardless of its
size, explicates an important theoretical point.
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